Akademik

   Established on 2 December 1925, the IG Farbenindustrie Ak-tiengesellschaft (literally, "Community of Interests of the Dye Industry, Inc. ) was an outgrowth of Carl Duisberg s* 1904 proposal to federate Germany s major dye and chemical firms into a giant trust. Aiming at the merger of capital holdings while preserving each company s individual identity, Duisberg, head of the Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedrich Bayer (Bayer) of Leverkusen, wished to link Bayer with Agfa (Aktiengesellschaft fur Anilin-Fabrikation) of Berlin, BASF (Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik) of Ludwigshafen, Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Bruning of Hoechst am Main (Hoechst), Leopold Cassella & Co. GmbH of Frankfurt am Main, and Kalle & Co. Aktiengesellschaft of Bieb-rich am Main. While his vision was premature, two competitive blocs evolved in 1907, and these in turn combined in 1916 into IG der deutschen Teerfarben-fabriken (Community of Interests of the German Tar Dye Factories).

   Taking advantage of tax laws that encouraged the formation of cartels,* the final merger, more the work of BASF's Carl Bosch* than of Duisberg, yielded Europe s largest corporation. With Duisberg heading the supervisory board and Bosch the managing board, Farben was neither a simple federation of formally independent firms nor a giant conglomerate focused strictly on dyes. Immersed in pharmaceuticals, photographic chemicals, film* and fibre production, artifi-cial-rubber and fuel fabrication, pesticides, and hydrogenation—encompassing development of fertilizers and explosives—the company defied classification as light or heavy industry, basic or finishing, export or domestic based, traditional or dynamic. By 1929 it was a decentralized firm employing about 120,000 peo-ple in more than 100 locations with an annual gross income exceeding 1.4 billion marks. Yet, consciously avoiding fields perceived to have little future as growth areas, it produced "only 40 percent of Germany s chemicals.

   Investment in the conversion of coal into oil, the impact of the depression,* and ill-fated ventures into international cartels damaged Farben in the Republic s final years. Peaking in 1929, sales dropped during the next three years by 38.4 percent. Although it remained among Germany s premier enterprises, its initia-tive faltered after 1930. Once Standard Oil of New Jersey alleviated Farben s economic emergency by buying the patents to its synthetic-fuel research, Farben redirected its endeavors to the German market. A steady sponsor of Germany s prorepublican, procapitalist parties (the DDP, the Center,* and the DVP), the firm supported Gustav Stresemann* while showing unflagging hostility to Alfred Hugenberg* and the DNVP.

   Although Stresemann s death and the depression sent the moderate parties into a tailspin, no Farben board member publicly endorsed the NSDAP before Hitler's* seizure of power, nor did anyone connected with Farben sign the "In-dustrialists Petition of November 1932 urging Hitler s appointment. While the NSDAP s abuse of international economic cooperation was a barrier to gaining company support, the chief obstacle was propaganda depicting Farben as an agent of Jewish finance. After Hitler's appointment Farben's executives con-cluded that they had exaggerated the dangers of Nazi rule. Requiring stable government to resume profitability, the firm was not simply "brought into line" in Hitler s Reich; it became a key participant in the Final Solution.

   REFERENCES:Borkin, Crime and Punishment ofI.G. Farben; Hayes, Industry and Ide-ology; Michels, Cartels, Combines, and Trusts; Stokes, Divide and Prosper.